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Abstract: The thesis advanced in this paper is that the proper names of cities or
countries inherit the linguistic types of the nouns which denote the basic category
of the objects the names refer to. As a result, in the case of the proper names of cities
or countries, a reference by those names may select particular aspects of those
objects, in the same way that book or newspaper selects the physical or informa-
tional aspects of objects in the extension of the nouns. This view is based on
Asher’s and Pustejovsky’s conception of dot type semantics.
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1 Introduction
The literature on proper names, including the recent debate between referentialism
and predicativism, is largely informed by examples of the proper names of people,
such asAristotleorAlexander theGreat. In this paper, I choose instead to concentrate
on the names of places, particularly on the proper names of cities and countries.
Some of them are syntactically distinguished by requiring the definite article, such
as the Alps or the Netherlands, but this feature is idiosyncratic for English and thus
not a feature of names as such.1 The proper names of places share many features
with personal names. Apart from individual uses exemplified by (1) and (2):
(1) Alfred studies in Princeton. (Burge 1973: 429)
(2) Britain lies under one metre of snow. (Cruse 2000: 117)
like personal proper names, proper names of cities and countries have systematic
predicative uses:2
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(3) I’ve never met an Ophelia before. (Payne and Huddleston 2002: 521)
(4) There are more than a dozen Salems in the United States. (Bach 2015: 772)
deferred uses (where the semantic value is an object other than the default referent
of the term, see below for more constraints):
(5) Obama left the Halloween party early.3
(6) My parents protested during Vietnam.4
and descriptive uses (where the semantic value is a distributive property corre-
sponding to the default referent of the term):
(7) She’s no Florence Nightingale. (Payne and Huddleston 2002: 521)
(8) Trieste is no Vienna.5
An interesting feature of the names of cities and countries, however, is that in
contrast to the names of people, whose default referents are their contextually
distinguished human bearers, the names of cities and countries systematically
refer to:
– geographical territories
(9) Eastern Scotland gets a lot of sun. (Paul 1994: 268)
– political entities
(10) Britain has declared war on San Marino. (Cruse 2000: 117)
– groups of people
(11) Indianapolis voted for the referendum. (Nunberg 1995: 117)
and even seem to change the referent in the middle of a sentence:
(12) Belgium is covered by a metre of snow, which is why it has asked France for
help in clearing it. (Viebahn 2018: 754)
3 Based on an example by Tayebi (2018). The context is the following “suppose that there is just
one guest at the party who is dressed like Obama. Intending to talk about him, the host says.”
Tayebi (2018: 567)
4 Example based on one in McElree et al. (2006). Other examples are given in Srinivasan and
Rabagliati (2015).
5 Example attributed to Frege in Boër (1975). An attested example is “Syriamust not becomea new
Bosnia” https://www.pressreader.com/oman/oman-daily-observer/20121019/281779921366585
Other examples are given in Matushansky (2006).
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(13) London is an ugly city but it is well run. (Borg 2012: 153)
(14) London is so unhappy, ugly and polluted that it should be destroyed and
rebuilt 100 miles away. (Chomsky 2000: 37)
As Viebahn (2018: 754) puts it for (12), “‘Belgium’ stands for a geographical region,
but the first anaphoric ‘it’ for a political entity.” In such examples it is unclear which
of the potential referents is the primary one and even if there is one primary.6 In this
paper I will only be concerned with the systematic reference of names of cities and
countries to geographical territories, political entities and inhabitants – such as in
(9)–(14) –which all seem to be equally plausible candidates for the default referents
(cf. Pethö 2001). After considering and rejecting deferred reference as a tool for the
analysis of such cases (Sections 2 and 3), I argue for treating the names of cities and
countries as referring to a single complex referent, in analogy to the treatment of
book or city in Asher and Pustejovsky’s dot type semantics.
2 Deferred reference
The most comprehensive analysis of deferred reference has been proposed by
GeoffreyNunberg (1993, 1995). AlthoughNunbergwas skeptical about the deferred
uses of proper names (cf. Nunberg 1992), it can be argued that there are uses of
proper names which pass linguistic tests analogous to those deployed by Nunberg
(1993, 1995) to argue for deferred reference of indexicals. In this section, I consider
deferred reference as a tool for the analysis of some uses of proper names but in the
following section I will argue against such an analysis of (9)–(14).
2.1 What is deferred reference?
Deferred reference occurs when we refer to one thing by way of another, where
the latter is somehow given by the context of utterance. Nunberg called the
auxiliary object given by context an index, reserving the term referent for the
intended semantic value of the expression used. The index corresponds to the
referent in a contextually salient manner. According to Nunberg, deferred
reference is constrained by themeaning components of an expression, specifying
the grammatical features whichmust be in agreement with either the index or the
6 For a dissenting opinion see Ueda (2015), who argues that the geographical territory is the
default referent of all geographical names.
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referent. A paradigmatic example is referring to the father of a girl with the
masculine pronoun he, while pointing at the girl:
(15) He is in real estate. (Nunberg 1993: 26)
or referring to an author while pointing at a book:
(16) She was my chemistry teacher. (Nunberg 1993: 26)
In both cases the referentmust agree in number, gender and animacy features with
those encoded in the meaning of the pronoun used, while the index is given by
demonstration (for demonstratives) or by the Kaplanian character (for other
indexicals).
Nunberg (1995) used these requirements to advocate that (17) should be
treated as a case of deferred reference (saidwhile handing the keys to a carwhich is
parked out back to a car park attendant):
(17) This is parked out back. (Nunberg 1995: 110)
“[W]ewouldbe inclined to say that the subject refers not to the key that the speaker is holding,
but to the car that the key goes with. And in fact all the linguistic evidence supports this
analysis. For example, the number of the demonstrative is determined by the intended
referent, not the demonstratum. So even if the customer is holding up several keys that fit a
single car, he would say ‘This is parked out back,’whereas if he’s holding up a single key that
fits several cars, he would say, ‘These are parked out back.’”(Nunberg 1995: 110)
In contrast, (18), uttered in the same situation, cannot be treated as deferred
reference, due to the grammatical features of I, which require that the referent be
animate:
(18) I am parked out back. (Nunberg 1995: 110)
As Nunberg puts it, “the verb…is first-person, not third-person aswewould expect
if the subject referred to a car” (1995: 128, n. 3). For (18), Nunberg proposes an
analysis in terms of meaning transfer involving the predicate, according to which
“the predicate parked out back contributes a property of persons, the property they
possess in virtue of the locations of their cars” (1995: 111), while the pronoun refers
directly to the speaker (cf. also Kijania-Placek 2020; Kijania-Placek and Banaś
2021).
2.2 Deferred reference of proper names
Some uses of proper names seem to behave in a manner analogous to (17). In (5),
repeated here:
190 Kijania-Placek
(5) Obama left the Halloween party very soon.
Barack Obama, being the default referent of the name Obama, can serve as the
index,which points to the person dressed asObama, corresponding to the index by
way of being dressed as Obama. Proper names in English do not possess many
grammatical features which would allow for testing, but plurality and anaphoric
reference are such features. If the person dressed as Barack Obamawere a woman,
we could comment on her behavior by uttering (19):
(19) She must have had one too many.
Assuming (19) was uttered immediately after (5), she is anaphoric onObama and is
feminine, which supports the hypothesis thatObama in (5) refers in a deferred way
to the only woman dressed as Barack Obama at this particular party. If two people
were dressed as Obama, we could appraise their costumes by saying (20):
(20) The Obamas have the best costumes.
Again, the grammatical features of the names follow those of the referents, not
those of the index. An example involving geographical names is (6), repeated here:
(6) My parents protested during Vietnam.
Here the index is the country, but the deferred referent is the Vietnam War. This
interpretation is supported by the grammatical requirements of the preposition
during, which demands an eventive complement. Since a country is not an event,
the referent is plausibly the most salient event that corresponds to it (cf. Kijania-
Placek and Banaś 2021).
The working hypothesis here is that the index for proper names is given by the
naming conventionwhich is relied upon in the context and the referent corresponds
to the index in a contextually salient manner. As alwayswith deferred reference, the
referent must agree with the name in whatever grammatical features the name
possesses. Languages other than English with more grammatical features that are
morphologically marked, such as Czech or Polish, are better suited for testing this
hypothesis and crosslinguistic analysis gives it preliminary support. I will not pur-
sue that analysis here, however, because although I believe that it can be sustained
for examples such as (5), (6), (20) or (21) below (for an extended argument see
Kijania-Placek and Banaś 2021), in the following section I will try to show that
deferred reference is not sustainable for the analysis of examples such as (9)–(14),
which are my main concern in this paper.
Names of places 191
2.3 Deferred reference of geographical names
Although deferred reference might arguably work for geographical names used as
in (6) or (21):
(21) John was shot during Vietnam.7 (Srinivasan and Rabagliati 2015: 134)
the same analysis would fail for (9)–(14). To see this, I will turn to a languagewith
rich morphological marking of the grammatical features of proper names, one
which allows number and gender agreement to be exploited in the grammatical
tests. Nunberg used that strategy in his argument for the deferred reference of
(17). By turning to Italian, where demonstratives and adjectives are marked for
gender, hewas able to rely on gender agreement: “the word for key is feminine, la
chiave, and the word for truck is masculine, il camion. If a customer gives the
attendant the key to a truck, it will be the referent, not the demonstratum, that
determines the gender of the demonstrative and the adjective for ‘parked’”
(Nunberg 1995: 110). Thus, when holding up a key (Italian: la chiave, fem., sg.) to
refer to a truck (Italian: il camion, masc.), he would say:
(17′) Questo è parcheggiato in dietro.
This.MSC is park.3SG.MSC in back.
‘This is parked in back.’ (Nunberg 1995: 110)
in compliance with the meaning requirements of the pronoun. An even more
inflected language is Polish, where not just personal pronouns and adjectives but
also demonstratives and verbs (in past tense) are sensitive to the grammatical
features of proper names. Before turning to examples such as (9)–(14), I will
demonstrate the testing strategy on an example that seems towork in an analogous
way to (5) and (6):8
7 The example is from Srinivasan and Rabagliati (2015) although they do not propose an analysis
in terms of deferred reference. It is important to note that I do not propose that geographical names
such as Vietnam can be analysed as deferred reference to war in all syntactic positions. Since in
Polish all geographical names are marked for gender and subject-verb gender agreement requires
the verb to follow the gender of the name in subject position, we would always find counterex-
amples in Polish, diminishing Nunberg test’s value as a diagnostic tool. For example, in Polish it is
felicitous to say (i)Wietnam był wielką tragedią [Vietnam.MSC be.3SG.PAST.MSC big tragedy] and
not (ii) *Wietnam była wielką tragedią [Vietnam.MSC be.3SG.PAST.FEM big tragedy] even though
wojna (‘war’) is feminine. Rather, my claim is that there are deferred uses of geographical names,
but neither (i) or (9)–(14) are one of them. (6) or (21) are. The tentative hypothesis, not argued
directly for in this paper, might be that there are no deferred uses of geographical names in subject
position. Compare the commentary to example (23) below. I would like to thank an anonymous
reviewer for making me clarify this point.
8 For examples exploiting the same correspondence see Jeshion (2015).
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(22) France played Germany tonight.
It seems that in (22) the country of France could be the index, and the team that
represents the country would be the deferred referent. Since proper names are not
marked for gender in English, it is not possible to establish deferred reference by
manipulating this feature. Additionally, the nature of the correspondence between
cities and their teams does not allow grammatical number to bemanipulated in the
manner adopted byNunberg in (17) (see the quote in Section 2.1 above). But gender
agreement can be tested in Polish, where the proper names of cities have been
assigned gender. (22) translated into Polish is (22′):
(22′) Francja grała dziś wieczór z
France.SG.FEM play.3SG.PAST.FEM today eveningwith
Niemcami.
Germany.PL.nMSCPERS9
If the country is the index and the team the deferred referent, the gender of the verb
should agree with the grammatical gender of team – drużyna, which is feminine in
Polish. This, however, turns out to be a coincidence – France (‘Francja’) is feminine
as well – which can be shown by changing the order of the names in (22). If (22) is
analyzable as deferred reference, so should be (23):
(23) Germany played France tonight.




In (23′) the verb agrees in number and gender with the name, but not with the
potential referent which is the team (still feminine and singular), excluding thus
the analysis of (22) or (23) as deferred reference. If (22) and (23) were a case of
deferred reference, (23′) should be infelicitous. Not because it is ungrammatical, it
is grammatical, but because the gender of the verb does not match the gender of
the default referent.
I will now use the same line of argumentation to show that examples (9)–(14)
cannot be analyzed by assuming, for example, the geographical territory to be the
9 In Polish, masculine personal (MSCPERS) is a gender of nouns which are used in the plural to
refer to groups of entities containing at least one male person, whereas nouns of non-masculine
personal (nMSCPERS) gender are used for all other groups. The gender of the names of cities or
countries are purely conventional.
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primary referent and treating the political entity and the inhabitants as deferred
referents. If (11), repeated here:
(11) Indianapolis voted for the referendum.
were a case of deferred reference, then in Polish the verb should be in gender and
number agreement with the referent, but it is not, as can be seen by considering
names differing in gender and number in the same construction (cf. also (Kijania-
Placek and Banaś 2021):
(11′) Indianapolis zagłosowało za referendum.
Indianapolis.SG.N vote.PAST.3SG.N for referendum
(24) Barcelona voted for the referendum.
(24′) Barcelona zagłosowała za referendum.
Barcelona.SG.FEM vote.PAST.3SG.FEM for referendum
(25) Katowice voted for the referendum.
(25′) Katowice zagłosowały za referendum.
Katowice.PL.nMSCPERS vote.PAST.3PL.nMSCPERS for referendum
In all (11), (11′), (24), (24′), (25) and (25′) the intended referents are the inhabitants of
the respective cities. But whatever the number and gender features associatedwith
the referents,10 the features should remain constant in (11′), (24′) and (25′), because
the type of the referent does not change. Instead, the agreement pattern follows the
number and gender of the proper names themselves, in violation of the constraints
of deferred reference. Analogous examples can be formulated to show that (10):
(10) Britain has declared war on San Marino.
cannot be analyzed as deferred reference either.11 In fact, since the argumentswere
independent of what was taken as the index, I have shown that neither the
10 I follow Nunberg in understanding the gender agreement requirements, who claims that the
gender in question “is determined by the grammatical gender of the name of the basic-level
category to which the referent of the expression belongs, or in the case of animates, usually by the
sex of the referent” (1993: 25–26).
11 The Polish translation of (10) is (10′):
(10′) Wielka Brytania wypowiedziała wojnę San Marino.
Britain.SG.FEM declare.PAST.3SG.FEM war.ACC San Marino.DAT.SG.N
which can be compared with:
(10a) Niemcy wypowiedziały wojnę San Marino.
Germany.PL.nMSCPERS declare.PAST.3PL.nMSCPERSwar.ACC San Marino.DAT.SG.N
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geographic territory, nor the political entity or the inhabitants, which are intuitive
referents in examples (9)–(14), can be interpreted as deferred referents. As we can
see, in contrast to the deferred reference interpretation that requires grammatical
features to follow those of the referents, in Polish the grammar follows the gender
and plurality characteristics of the proper name in all cases – for example,
mieszkańcy (‘inhabitants’) are masculine personal in Polish. This is particularly
discernible in examples such as (14) and its Polish counterpart (14′),
which combine two types of potential referents, or (26) and (26′), which combine all
three:
(14) London is so unhappy, ugly and polluted that it should be destroyed and
rebuilt 100 miles away.
(14′) Londyn jest tak nieszczęśliwy, paskudny
London.SG.MSC is so unhappy.PAST.3SG.MSC ugly.PAST.3SG.MSC
i zanieczyszczony, że powinien być
and pollute.PAST.3SG.MSC that should.PAST.3SG.MSC be
zniszczony
destroy.PAST.3SG.MSC
i wybudowany na nowo 100 mil dalej.
and build.PAST.3SG.MSC anew 100 miles away
(26) Britain, despite the fact that it is lying under one metre of snow and is
mourning the death of the Queen Mother’s corgi, has declared war on San
Marino. (Cruse 2000: 117)
(26′) Wielka Brytnia, mimo że jest pokryta metrem
Britain.SG.FEM despite that is cover.PAST.3SG.FEM one-meter snow
śniegu i jest w żałobie po corgi Królowej Matki,
snow and is in mourning after corgi Queen Mother’s
wypowiedziała wojnę San Marino.
declare.PAST.3SG.FEM war San Marino.DAT
In (14) unhappy concerns the inhabitants, while ugly, polluted, destroyed and
rebuilt – the territory or physical aspects of the city. Although territory (‘terytorium’)
in Polish is neuter, and inhabitants (‘mieszkańcy’) masculine personal, all gender
agreements follow the masculine gender of the proper name.12 Similarly with (26),
where covered concerns a geographical territory, in mourning concerns the
12 Nothing hinges on calling the aspect territory instead of, e.g., location, because the latter in
Polish is położenie – another neuter noun. The same for place (‘miejsce’, neuter).
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population and declare a political entity, all expressions are in gender agreement
with the gender of the proper name, disregarding the varying genders of the po-
tential deferred referents.13 From the grammatical point of view, it seems that Britain
is just a territory, a political entity, and its inhabitants/citizens taken as one complex
entity, whatever its “real”metaphysical status. Different predicates select particular
aspects of the object, the way predication selects for particular aspects in the case of
nouns such as book or city. In what follows, I propose an analysis of examples such
as (9)–(14) based on the treatment of book and city by Asher and Pustejovsky.
3 The semantic properties of book and city
Interpretation processes such as deferred reference rely on one sense of a word
being the default one and subject to meaning or reference transfers. Yet withmany
words there does not seem to be a clear sense of which of its many senses is the
default one. As Nunberg put it: “there is a substantial class of cases where we have
no principled grounds for deciding which of several uses is conventional” (Nun-
berg 1979: 154; cf. also Carston 2012). A canonical example is the noun book, which
has at least two candidates for the primary sense and the noun can be used to talk
about any of them (Bosch 2007; Carston 2012; Chomsky 2000; Pustejovsky 1995,
2005):
– a physical object
(27) Mary burned my book on Mahler. (Pustejovsky 2005: 6)
– a set of ideas, content, information
(28) Mary believes all of Chomsky’s books. (Pustejovsky 2005: 6)
These senses (content vs. physical object) can be combined in one sentence, as in
Chomsky’s famous examples:
(29) The book that he is planning will weigh at least five pounds if he ever writes
it. (Chomsky 2000: 180)
(30) His book is in every store in the country. (Chomsky 2000: 180)
Or Carston’s:14
13 Strictly speaking jest w żałobie (‘is in mourning’) is not marked for gender – only verbs in the
past tense are somarked in Polish – butwould be feminine, if the examplewas changed to the past
tense (była w żałobie – was.PAST.2SG.FEM in mourning).
14 Other examples are given in, e.g., Antunes and Chaves (2003), Asher and Pustejovsky (2005),
Asher (2011), Dölling (2020), Falkum and Vicente (2015), Frisson (2009), and Viebahn (2018).
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(31) Peter is reading the novel he found at the bus-stop. (Carston 2012: 616)
Even the first part of (31):
(32) Peter is reading the novel.
deploys both the physical and informational aspects of book, because, as Pustejovsky
andChomsky insisted, the verb read requires a complement that is both informational
andphysical at the same time. This last feature is especially important, as it shows that
the two aspects are not disjunctive and that the referent of book is the “whole” book,
with both of its aspects (cf. Asher 2011). This behavior is in contrast with homonymous
words, which behave differently in the contradiction test, where a sentence featuring
two occurrences of the expression and one occurrence of negation can be true, as it is
for bank but not for book (cf. Viebahn 2018):
(33) This is a bank, but it is not a bank [in a different sense]. (Viebahn 2018: 758)
(34) *That is a book, but it is not a book. (Viebahn 2018: 758)
This shows that when we point at a physical book, we point at an informational
book at the same time. Similar ideas are proposed by Cruse (he uses the term facet
for what Asher and Pustejovsky call aspect, see below; cf. also Asher 2011; Asher
and Pustejovsky 2005; Cruse 1986; Dölling 2020):
“Facets can be described as fully discrete but non-antagonistic readings of a word. Another
important characteristic is that they are characteristically of distinct ontological types.
However, in spite of their discreteness and ontological distinctness it would not be correct to
say that they represented distinct concepts: they are somehow fused into a single conceptual
unit. Amongst the evidence for this claim the following may be cited:
(i) Ordinary speakers are not normally aware of the dual nature of book: it has to be pointed
out to them (however, once pointed out, it becomes obvious). The facets form a single,
unified ‘gestalt’. The default reading of book is the combined one.
(ii) As we have seen, predicates selecting different facets can co-ordinate without zeugma,
and there is no normal requirement for speakers to intend, or hearers to identify, only one
of the facets, as is the case with true ambiguity.
(iii) The combined reading functions as a basic level item.
(iv) Some predicates require both facets to be present: publish a book, John is reading a book.
(v) The combinedmeaning canbemetaphorically extended: John’smind is a closedbook tome.
This cannot be construed unless one takes into account both facets.
(vi) The combination may bear a proper name (e.g. Britain).” (Cruse 2000: 116)
Aspects are not physical parts of an object. As Asher insisted: “[a]ll of the book
(in its material aspect) is a material object, and all of the book (in its informational
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aspect) is also an informational object. And sowe can’t conclude that the book isn’t
amaterial object (or an informational object) at some time, state or location” (2006:
14; see also Collins 2017). It is important to note, however, that the aspects of book
also cannot be equated with the type/token distinction, as can be seen in the
interplay between the noun and the counting principles (Asher and Pustejovsky
2005):
(35) The student read every book in the library. (Asher and Pustejovsky 2005: 11)
(36) The student carried off every book in the library. (Asher and Pustejovsky
2005: 11)
(37) John has stolen every book there is. (Asher and Pustejovsky 2005: 14)
While in (35) what is counted are the informationally distinguished books, in (36)
the quantifier is only sensitive to the physical object aspect of book. Yet the default
interpretation of (37) requires John stealing one (physical) copy of every book in the
informational sense. Additionally, the physical aspects of book alone already
require a counterpart of the type-token distinction, which can be seen in the
distinction between a particular copy of a book (38), the physical properties of an
edition (39) and a purely informational aspect of a book (40) (Copestake and
Briscoe 1995):
(38) That book is covered with coffee. [physical object – token] (Copestake and
Briscoe 1995: 53)
(39) That book has an unreadable font. [physical object – type] (Copestake and
Briscoe 1995: 53)
(40) That book is full of metaphorical language. [content] (Copestake and
Briscoe 1995: 53)
Thus far I have concentrated on the properties of book, but the phenomenon of
many-aspect words is ubiquitous in natural language. For example, dictionary,
newspaper, map, letter, film or CD all have physical and informational aspects;
speech, lecture,movie or playhave eventive and informational aspects; nouns such
as bank, school, university, parliament, church or opera designate institutions and
the buildings those institutions reside in; lunch, dinner, as well as human and city
(see below) are reported to “refer to entities which in each case seem to have a dual
nature” (Dölling 2020: 9; see also Asher and Pustejovsky 2000; Ortega-Andrés and
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Vicente 2019; Pustejovsky 2005). As (38)–(40) show, duality – physical object vs.
content – does not really do justice to the semantic complexity of book. The situ-
ation is evenmore obvious with newspaper, which has at least three basic aspects:
copy/physical object (41), information/content (42), and organization/institution/
publisher (43) (based on examples in Pustejovsky 2005):
(41) The cup is on top of the newspaper.
(42) I disagreed with the newspaper.
(43) The newspaper fired its editor.
They can combine in copredication and anaphoric references:15
(44) She handed me an envelope containing all the newspapers she had worked
for. (Nunberg 1995: 126) [physical object vs. organization]
(45) The newspaper is full of coffee stains and turned out to be very
uninteresting. (Dölling 2020: 12) [physical object vs. content]
(46) Mary was fired by the newspaper and so she vowed to never read it again.
(Antunes and Chaves 2003: 7) [organization vs. content]
For our present purposes, an important many-aspect word is city (Asher and Puste-
jovsky 2000; Dölling 2020; Pustejovsky 1998). It exhibits at least the location/territory
aspect (47), the organization/political entity aspect (48) and the inhabitants/collection
of people aspect (49) (Asher and Pustejovsky 2000):
(47) Many cities have good restaurants. (Asher and Pustejovsky 2000: 9)
(48) Many cities have adopted anti-smoking legislation. (Asher and Pustejovsky
2000: 9)
(49) Many cities vote Democratic. (Asher and Pustejovsky 2000: 9)
15 It is alleged by, e.g., Antunes and Chaves (2003), Chatzikyriakidis and Luo (2015), and Dölling
(2020) that the physical object sense does not combine with the organization sense, but the
examples of Nunberg, such as (44) as well as “‘Which newspaper did Mary burn?’we ask, and the
answer might well be, ‘the one John works for’” (Nunberg 1995: 126) undermine this claim.
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They all combine felicitously, as in the following examples:
(50) The city that John lives in just passed a law against smoking in bars.
(Asher and Pustejovsky 2000: 8) [territory vs. organization]
(51) The city is extremely polluted, but voted against smoking in public places
last year. [territory vs. people]
(52) Most cities that vote democratic passed anti-smoking legislation last year.
(Asher 2011: 132) [territory vs. people]
Pustejovsky (1995) suggested an influential semantics for the analysis of many
aspect words, which was later developed in a serious of works co-authored with
Nicolas Asher and by Asher himself. In the following Section, I will briefly introduce
Pustejovsky’s proposal and in Section 5 I will deploy the theory to the analysis of the
proper names of cities and countries.
4 •-type words
Pustejovsky’s ideas were motivated by the phenomenon of copredication, i.e. the
grammatical construction in which two predicates apply to the same argument.16
Predicates select for specific argument types but also some arguments select the
predicates that govern them (Pustejovsky 1991). In general, predication is only
successful if the predicate and its arguments are of compatible types, as in (53),
where the predicate heavy requires an argument to be a physical object:
(53) This suitcase is heavy.
Copredication is unproblematic when the argument fulfills the requirement of both
of the predicates (54) but typically renders an expression infelicitous if it is not so
(55):
(54) He vandalized and then burned down the shop.
(55) *Cats are mammals and sell well in toy shops.
In some cases involving nouns such as book, dinner, city or those mentioned in the
previous section, however, copredication is successful even though the
16 Another motivation for •-type theories are individuation and counting principles (see Asher
and Pustejovsky 2005; Chatzikyriakidis and Luo 2015), mentioned in the previous section with
reference to examples (35)–(37). Since the main focus of this paper are proper names, I will
disregard counting and individuation considerations in what follows.
200 Kijania-Placek
requirements of the predicates are conflicting. Thus (56) is perfectly felicitous, even
though burn requires a physical object while for on Mahler an informational one is
needed (Pustejovsky 2005):
(27) Mary burned my book on Mahler.
A similar phenomenon occurs in anaphoric reference, as exemplified by (56):
(56) John’s mother burned the book on magic before he mastered it. (Asher
2011: 170)
The first predicate requires the argument be a physical object, while the pronoun it
refers anaphorically to an informational one – the content of the book. Pustejovsky
(1995) categorizes all nouns by types, but argues that copredication phenomena
supports complex typing for words such as book. What he calls dot type or •-type is
formed by two or more simple types (simple types are physical object, informational
object etc.) but are not their ordinary sums.While some predicates require one of the
simple types, as exemplified by (27), (54), and (55), other require an argument of the
complex type. The example Pustejovsky mentions in connection with book are the
verbs read andwrite, which require an object which is physical and informational at
the same time.17 Constituent types also support divergent counting principles for the
•-type words, which explains the different truth conditions for (35) and (37) above.
According to Pustejovsky andAsher (Asher andPustejovsky 2005; Pustejovsky
1995) what explains copredication is that for •-type words the constituent types
correspond to aspects of objects denoted by those words and those aspects are
available simultaneously – at least for words with two constituent types – during
composition of the meaning of the whole sentence. The authors alternatively use
the term dot object in connection with •-type words but insists that dot object
“refers to objects with a complex type (not to complex objects – whatever those
might be – or to pairs of objects), with several aspects which have become part of
the meanings of the words that denote such objects. Such dot objects allow for
predications which are licensed over either of the two dot element types” (Asher
and Pustejovsky 2005: 7).18 • is a binary type construction operator but it can be
17 Pustejovsky (1998: 341) goes as far as to claim that read coerces its argument into a physical
object•content type, as in: “Mary read the subway wall.”
18 Asher (2011) argued that the denotations should be bare particulars that can be conceptualized
in various ways, Arapinis and Vieu (2015) treat aspects as mereological parts of objects, while for
Ortega-Andrés and Vicente (2019: 4) dot objects “are compilations of senses, each with its own
denotation.” In this paper I remain neutral with respect to the ontological status of objects denoted
by •-type words. Followingmost other authors working on •-types, I use the term denotation as an
umbrella term standing for objects in the extension of a word (for common nouns) or objects the
words refer to (for proper names).
Names of places 201
iterated, as is required by newspaper, whose type consist of three simple types and
is structured as organization•(content•physical object) (Pustejovsky 2005).
Asher and Pustejovsky propose to treat all words mentioned in Section 3 as
•-types but those relevant for our analysis of proper names are the words city and
country. As for newspaper, the •-types of city and country consist of (at least) three
types, corresponding to the territory, organization/government and inhabitants/
citizens aspects of cities and countries, which, as newspaper, are structured as
double •-types: people•(territory•political entity) (Asher and Pustejovsky 2000;
Pustejovsky 1998, 2005). The constituent aspects are available for predication, as
exemplified by (47)–(52) above, as well as by (57)–(59):
(57) John travelled to the country last month. (Dölling 2020: 4) [territory]
(58) So, do you think a country has the right to kill an unarmed man?
(Galery 2012: 46) [political entity]
(59) The country voted against the EU constitution
in the 2005 referendum.19
[people]
In what follows I will argue that proper names of cities and countries inherit the
semantics of the respective common nouns and should be analyzed as •-types.
5 Names of cities behave like city
Although the theses of type theorists primarily concerned common nouns, the
examples they use include the proper names of both countries and cities. Cruse’s
analysis did not involve the semantic machinery of types, but his concept of facets
is akin to that of aspects and he explicitly suggested that some proper names may
be considered as multifaceted words (Cruse 2000, cited above). The thesis I pro-
pose here is that the proper names of cities and countries are such multi-aspect
words and that they should be analyzed as Pustejovsky’s •-type words, i.e. as a
people•(territory•political entity) types.20 The aspect labeled political entity con-
cerns the abstract, institutional features of a city/country, while those labeled
territory concern its physical aspects and people its human ones. As is the case for
19 Adapted from Evans (2015).
20 Ueda (2015) briefly considers treating geographical names as dot-types but dismisses such an
analysis. His argument, however, amounts to considering just one counterexample and I do not
share Ueda’s judgment of the infelicity of that example.
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book and city, predication can select specific constituent aspects (some examples
are repeated from previous sections):
(2) Britain lies under one metre of snow. [territory]
(9) Eastern Scotland gets a lot of sun. [territory]
(60) Brazil is the largest country in South America.
(Ortega-Andrés and Vicente 2019: 1) [territory]
(61) Liverpool is spread out. (Retoré 2014: 214) [territory]
(11) Indianapolis voted for the referendum. [people]
(62) Britain mourns the death of the Queen Mother’s corgi.
(Cruse 2000: 117) [people]
(63) The south side of Cambridge voted Conservative.
(Copestake and Briscoe 1995: 27) [people]
(64) France voted against the EU constitution in the 2005 referendum.
(Evans 2015: 106) [people]
(65) France is one of the leading nations in the European Union.
(Evans 2015: 106) [people]
(10) Britain has declared war on San Marino. [political entity]
(66) London said that a new passport could not be issued.
(Copestake and Briscoe 1995: 43) [political entity]
(67) Brazil is a republic. (Ortega-Andrés and Vicente 2019: 1)
[political entity]
In the examples above, predication concerns different aspects of the respective
cities and countries but none of the aspects seems to be the primary one. They can
easily combine in copredication and anaphora:
(68) Germany is a central European democracy. (Collins 2017: 680)
[territory vs. political entity]
(12) Belgium is covered by a metre of snow, which is why it has asked France for
help in clearing it. [territory vs. political entity]
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(13) London is an ugly city but it is well run. [territory vs. political entity]
(14) London is so unhappy, ugly and polluted that it should be destroyed and
rebuilt 100 miles away. [people vs. territory]
(69) London tends to vote Conservative, despite being the largest urban area in
the U.K. (Collins 2017: 680) [people vs. territory]
(26) Britain, despite the fact that it is lying under one metre of snow and is
mourning the death of the Queen Mother’s corgi, has declared war on San
Marino. [territory vs. people vs. political entity]
(70) Brazil is a large Portuguese-speaking republic that is very high in inequality
Rankings.21 [territory vs. people vs. political entity]
(71) Brazil is a large two-century-old Portuguese-speaking country.
(Arapinis and Vieu 2015: 290) [territory vs. political entity vs. people]
I propose that in the kind of uses exemplified by (9)–(14), in contrast to the predi-
cative, deferred and descriptive uses exemplified by (4), (6) or (8) respectively, the
proper names of countries and cities directly refer to their objects of reference,
regardless of whether the focus is on the territorial (physical), political or human
aspects of the referents. While lexical semantics is informed by common sense
metaphysics, which provides the basic types for words and the basic relations
between types, the thesis advanced here should not be taken as one about the
metaphysics of the objects referred to by the names Paris or Brazil. The claim would
rather be that, regardless of the metaphysical status of cities, Paris itself would
inherit it.
Part of the thesis I advance is that the kinds of aspects that enter the lexical entry
underlying the direct use of a proper name are those common to all names of a
particular category, i.e. those intrinsic to its being a city or country respectively.
Thus, while I am open to including additional aspects on the list, I oppose many
authors directly or indirectly relating their theories to •-types, who include features
specific only to some cities among constituent types (or their equivalents thereof).
An important, often included aspect is representation as in that by a sports team.
Thus, e.g. in Ortega-Andrés and Vicente (2019), Retoré (2014), or Evans (2015) we
encounter examples such as (73), (75) or (76) indiscriminately mixed with examples
21 Based on an example of Ortega-Andrés and Vicente (2019).
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of the territory, people or political entity type (some examples are repeated from
above):
(61) Liverpool is spread out. [territory]
(72) Liverpool voted. (Retoré 2014: 214) [people] or [political entity]
(73) Liverpool won. (Retoré 2014: 214) [representation]
(74) France is a country of outstanding natural beauty. (Evans 2015: 106)
[territory]
(65) France is one of the leading nations in the European Union. [people]
(75) France beat New Zealand in the 2007 Rugby world cup. (Evans 2015: 106)
[representation]
(64) France voted against the EU constitution in the 2005 referendum.
[people]
(67) Brazil is a republic. [political entity]
(76) Brazil has won five World Championships.
(Ortega-Andrés and Vicente 2019: 1) [representation]
(60) Brazil is the largest country in South America. [territory]
To argue for my exclusive position, I will start by making a methodological point.
The distinction I propose, between aspects which are included in the •-type of a
name and those that are excluded, is a principled one which is based on the
inherent, necessary features of cities and countries respectively,whatever they are.
The alternative proposal is arbitrary and lucking a criterion for selecting the
aspects. Ortega-Andrés and Vicente (2019) are, as far as I know, the only authors
who may be taken to have indirectly argued for including sports representation
among constituent types, but at the same time they opted against including the
exam aspect for school on the basis of exams not being necessary for the school’s
existence. Yet, since not all cities have sports teams which represent them, that
aspect is equally unnecessary. Still, we need a criterion, because representation is
not the only potential aspect that the proper names of cities and countries are used
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to depict. Onemore candidate for an aspect could be an event connectedwith a city
or country, as in (6), repeated from Section 1:
(6) My parents protested during Vietnam.
In Section 2.2 I proposed an analysis of this example bydeferred reference but there
seems to be no reason why Ortega-Andrés and Vicente, Retoré, or Evans should
exclude the event aspect from •-type (or equivalent) analysis of Vietnam and other
names of cities. Other aspects could be considered and thus a criterion is required
on pain of a theory lacking explanatory power.
My next argument comes from an intuitive difference between the basic terri-
torial, political and human aspects of cities and countries on the one hand and other
aspects, such as representation or event. While choosing a primary referent among
territory, people or political entitymight be a challenge and all are equally available
for selection inpredication, it seems clear that neither theVietnamwarnor the sports
team are the primary referents of the respective proper names. Rather, as in deferred
reference, the interpretation process proceeds through the country of Vietnam to the
war, which is not an internal aspect of the country but corresponds to it in a
contextually salient manner.22
Finally, I turn to linguistic data to support my thesis. While there are some
cases of successful co-predication (see Ortega-Andrés and Vicente 2019), in most
cases co-predication between the basic aspects and the representation aspect fail,
as some of the authors themselves notice:
(77) Liverpool is spread out and voted (last Sunday). (Retoré 2014: 214)
[territory vs. people]
(78) *Liverpool voted and won (last Sunday). (Retoré 2014: 214)
[territory vs. representation]
(79) *Liverpool won the cup and voted against having a mayor.
(Retoré 2013: 5) [representation vs. people]
(80) *Barcelona plays Real Madrid tonight and is the fifth most populous urban
area in the European Union. [representation vs. territory]
22 As I have shown in Section 2.3, the sports team interpretation cannot be obtained by deferred
reference. I leave detailed analysis of such examples for a different occasion, but my tentative
suggestion is that the proper name refers directly to the city/country but it is the predicate that
undergoesmeaning transfer. As a result, what is predicated is a feature of the city or country that its
team won. See Nunberg’s analysis of (18) by meaning transfer, mentioned in Section 2.1 above.
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This puts the sports representation aspect apart from territory, people and political
entity aspects, which are easily available for both co-predication and anaphora.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have proposed a •-typed based interpretation of some uses of proper
names of cities and countries. I have argued that an aspect of a city (or country)
enters the semantics of its name only if it is constitutive for its being a city (or
country). The aspects distinguished are thus those labeled territory, people and
political entity. I have argued against including sports representation of a country
or city or an event corresponding to it among aspects included in the •-type of a
proper name.
The complex, many aspect nature of the referents of names of cities and
countries can be traced back to them being social artefacts. A natural extension of
the proposal would thus be a semantics of other institutional names, including the
names of schools, universities or legal proper names such as the Constitution of the
United States or The European Parliament. This requires further research.
Since none of the distinguished aspects is the basic one for a proper name like
Paris, the name refers directly to an object which somehow encompasses all of these
aspects. However, the proper names of countries and cities, as well as personal
proper names, additionally have predicative, deferred, or descriptive uses, which
are based on semantic mechanisms other than direct reference. I share an inclusive
approach to semantics that aims to incorporate all systematic uses of expressions of
a type in the analysis of its meaning (Levinson 2000). In the case of proper names,
such an approach naturally leads to proposing a polysemous account of proper
names.23 That, however, is a topic for another paper.
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